One of the key take-aways from Peter Evans's piece, "The Eclipse of the State? Reflections on Stateness in an Era of Globalization," published in 1997, bears repeating, I think, given the recent excess and pillage in the world of global finance these last few years:
The "dictatorship of international finance" is really closer to a mutual hostage situation. The operation of the international financial system would descend quickly into chaos without responsible fiscal and monetary policies on the part of international actors. Financial markets can easily punish deviant states, but in the long run their returns depend on the existence of an interstate system in which the principal national economies are under the control of competent and "responsible" state actors. Those who sit astride the international financial system need capable regulators. The lightning speed at which transactions of great magnitude can be completed makes for great allocational efficiency in theory, but it also makes for great volatility in practice. "Rogue traders" are (as the name implies) supposed to be aberrations: yet the possibility of enormous returns from speculative activity makes the rogue role a continual temptation. After a certain point, reducing the power of states to interfere increases collective exposure to risk more than it expands the possibilities for individual profits.
Prescient, and true. Article here.